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1. Introduction 
 
Previous studies find that firm characteristics such as size, foreign ownership, and export status 
are important determinants of foreign technology acquisition.
1 But the potential spillover effect 
from licensing in the same industry as well as in vertically related industries has been largely 
overlooked.
2 Using Chilean data, this paper shows that plants operating in sectors that rely 
relatively more on foreign technology licensing are less likely to use foreign licenses, but plants 
that provide intermediate inputs to sectors with high licensing activity are more like to import 
technologies, even after controlling for a variety of plant characteristics. Plants with previous 
experience importing technologies are more likely to use technology licenses. This suggests that 
sunk costs of importing technologies may be important. One implication of this paper is that 
incentives to purchase foreign technologies through licenses may potentially have important 
effects on technology acquisition by other firms operating in the same industry and in upstream 
sectors. 
 
2. Data and Basic Patterns 
 
The empirical analysis uses plant-level data from Chile for the years 1990 through 1999. The 
data covers the universe of Chilean manufacturing plants with 10 or more workers. For each 
plant and year, information on production, value added, sales, employment and wages 
(production and non-production), exports, investment, depreciation, energy usage, foreign 
technology licenses, and other plant characteristics is available. 
Table 1 shows the annual distribution of plants by licensing activity for the period 1990-
1999. On average, 5.4% of the total number of plants uses foreign technology licenses. The share 
of licensees increased during the period. In 1991 only 4.8% of the plants spent on foreign 
licenses while in 1999 the share of plants was 5.5%. 
 
Table 1: Number and Percentage of Plants Importing Technologies through Licensing 
  Total Number of Plants  Licensees 
     Number  % of Total 
1990 4,574  218  4.8 
1991 4,758  255  5.4 
1992 4,931  254  5.2 
1993 5,036  276  5.5 
1994 5,078  263  5.2 
1995 5,107  277  5.4 
1996 5,447  308  5.7 
1997 4,960  259  5.2 
1998 4,815  276  5.7 
1999 4,400  243  5.5 
Average 1990-1999  4,911  263  5.4 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Giannitsis (1991), Montalvo and Yafeh (1994), Kokko and Blomström (1995), Katrak (1997), 
Vishwasrao and Bosshardt (2001), and Kiyota and Okazaki (2005). 
2 Montalvo and Yafeh (1994) and Vishwasrao and Bosshardt (2001) study horizontal spillovers but they do not 
examine the effect of licensing in downstream sectors. But interactions between suppliers of inputs and purchasers 
may have been very important to diffuse technology in many countries (Stewart and Ghani, 1992).   2
Table 2 presents the percentage of licensees in a given year that continue using licenses 
the following year. Using the sample of all firms, an average of 62% of licensees continues 
purchasing technology through this mechanism the following period. By restricting the sample to 
plants that operated during the entire period, the number increases to 70%. These numbers 
suggest that sunk costs of importing technologies may be important. 
 
Table 2: Persistence in Licensing Status 
(% of Licensees in year t-1 that continue using licenses in year t) 
Year t  All Plants  Balanced Panel 
1991 66.5  77.6 
1992 59.2  68.5 
1993 67.3  75.7 
1994 60.1  71.7 
1995 64.3  71.7 
1996 59.9  71.7 
1997 56.8  58.0 
1998 64.1  70.4 
1999 62.7  67.2 




We employ a dynamic empirical model developed by Roberts and Tybout (1997) and later used 
by Kiyota and Okazaki (2005) to analyze the decision to import a foreign technology with sunk 
fixed costs. A firm uses a foreign technology if current and expected revenues are greater than 
current period costs plus any sunk cost of importing it: 
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where  Iijt is equal to 1 if firm i operating in sector j imported a technology at time t, l
ijt π  
measures current and expected revenues, cijt are current costs, and F represents the fixed cost of 
importing a technology. To identify the factors that affect the probability of importing a 
technology we use a binary-choice model of the form: 
 
-1 1 if  (1 ) 0
,
0 otherwise









where Xijt is a vector of plant characteristics, which includes total factor productivity (TFP), size, 
a dummy equal to one for exporters, a dummy equal to one for plants importing intermediate 
inputs, a dummy variable for plants with foreign ownership, the ratio of skilled workers to total 
workers, and age. The vector  {, } ijt ijt jt Y Horizontal Downstream =  attempts to measure the 
potential spillover effect from importing technologies in the same industry (Horizontal) and in   3
downstream industries (Downstream). The horizontal variable is defined as the stock of other 




















The stock of licenses is obtained using the perpetual inventory method for each plant as 
in Hasan (2002):  1(1 ) kjt kjt kjt SL L SL δ − =+ − , where Lkjt are royalties and license fees paid at time t, 
and δ is the rate of depreciation, assumed to be 5%.
3 To determine the starting values for SL, 
information on royalties and license fees for the year 1979 is used. For plants that entered after 
1979, the value of the first payment in royalties and licenses is used as the initial value of SL. 
The Downstreamjt variable is a proxy for the licensing activity of industries that are 


























where  jm α  is the proportion of sector j’s output supplied to sector m.
4 Table 3 shows descriptive 
statistics for all variables. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Licensee Dummy  40,476  0.060  0.237  0  1 
Log(Total Factor Productivity)  40,476  6.933  1.136  -4.572  12.739
Log(Employment) 40,476  3.751  1.048  1.099  8.270 
Export Dummy  40,476  0.231  0.421  0  1 
Import Intermediate Inputs Dummy  40,476  0.265  0.441  0  1 
Log(Age) 40,476  2.136  0.845  0  3.045 
Foreign Ownership Dummy  40,476  0.059  0.235  0  1 
Skilled / Total Employment  40,476  0.246  0.180  0.005  0.993 
Log(Horizontal)  40,476 -4.698  0.907  -8.924 -1.882 
Log(Downstream) 40,476  -6.688  1.498  -11.247  -3.635 
 
 
                                                 
3 Hasan (2002) assumes a rate of depreciation of 6%. We also calculated the stocks using a depreciation rate of 10%. 
The results, however, do not change if this depreciation rate is used. 
4 We calculate these coefficients using data from the input-output matrix of Chile, constructed by the Central Bank 
of Chile, at the 3-digit ISIC level for the year 1996. Given that we are interested in linkages within the country and 
across productive sectors, we exclude the output for final consumption as well as the imports of intermediate 
products.   4
The binary-choice model is estimated as: 
 
1- 1 1- 2 1 1 2 Pr( 1) log( ) log( )
                     ,
ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt jt
j t ijt
I I I X Horizontal Downstream ααβ γ γ
δδε
− == + + + +
+++
        (1) 
 
where  j δ and  t δ are sector and year dummy variables. To reduce potential simultaneity problems, 




Equation (1) is first estimated using OLS. Columns (1) and (4) in Table 4 show the results. More 
productive and skill-intensive plants are more likely to import technologies. Exporters, 
importers, and plants with foreign ownership are also more likely to use licenses. Employment 
has a non-monotonic effect. As employment increases, plants appear less likely to use licenses, 
but after a certain threshold they tend to rely more on licenses. Plants that imported technologies 
the previous year, and two years before, are more likely to import technologies, implying that 
sunk costs of importing may be important. The estimate for the horizontal variable is negative 
and significant, suggesting there may be a negative spillover effect from other firms’ licensing. 
The backward variable is positive and significant, which suggests that contacts between licensees 
and their suppliers may increase the suppliers’ probability of importing foreign technologies. 
Columns (2) and (5) present the estimates using a probit model. The estimates are similar than 
those obtained by OLS, with the exception of employment which is no longer significant. 
Neither OLS nor probit estimation provides a consistent estimate of the lag of the 
dependent variable. Moreover, they do not take into account the role of unobserved plant 
heterogeneity and the potential endogeneity of the right-hand side variables. In order to deal with 
these issues, equation (1) is estimated using a dynamic panel estimation method, System GMM. 
The results are in columns (3) and (6). Most plant characteristics become not significant, 
although productivity and employment are still significant at 10%. The first lag of the dependent 
variable is positive and significant, while the second lag is not significant. The horizontal 
spillover variable remains negative but it is only significant at 10%, while the estimate of the 
backward variable remains virtually unchanged, and significant at 1%. 
One possible explanation for the negative effect of the horizontal variable can be found in 
the literature of technology diffusion.
5 One group of models, “stock models” (e.g., Reinganum, 
1981a, 1981b), suggests that as the number of firms that adopt a technology increases, the 
benefits of the marginal adopter decrease. Thus, there is a point at which technology adoption is 
not profitable anymore. A second group of models, “order models” (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 
1985), is based on the idea that the order in which firms adopt a technology determines the net 




This paper shows that licensing activity may have important spillover effects. Higher stocks of 
royalties and license fees by other firms in a given sector decreases the probability that a plant 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Karshenas and Stoneman (1993), and Stoneman (2002).   5
operating in that sector purchase foreign technologies through licenses. But there are also 
positive vertical spillovers since higher licensing activity increases the probability that plants in 
upstream sectors import technologies using licenses. These results suggest that policies that 
induce firms to buy foreign technologies through licenses may potentially have important effects 
on technology acquisition of other firms in the same industry as well as firms in upstream 
sectors. 
 
Table 4: The Probability of Importing Technologies through Licensing 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 OLS  Probit  System 
GMM 
OLS Probit  System 
GMM 
Licensee  Previous  Year 0.4113  0.2877 0.4410 0.4106  0.2857 0.4348 
 (32.67)** (38.12)** (3.71)** (24.35)** (34.36)** (3.68)**
Licensee  Two  Years  0.2289  0.1083 0.0732 0.2282  0.1073 0.0912 
Before (19.33)** (19.00)** (0.56) (17.03)** (18.80)** (0.73) 
TFP  0.0071  0.0062 0.0426 0.0071  0.0062 0.0421 
  (4.27)** (4.71)** (1.88)+ (3.92)** (4.24)** (1.87)+ 
Employment  -0.0365  -0.0001 -0.2299 -0.0361  -0.0003 -0.2201 
  (3.68)** (0.02) (1.83)+  (3.84)** (0.05) (1.81)+ 
Employment  Squared  0.0058  0.0009 0.0268 0.0057  0.0010 0.0256 
  (4.54)** (1.52) (1.91)+  (4.87)** (1.44) (1.89)+ 
Exporter  0.0101 0.0085  -0.0094  0.0100 0.0084  -0.0103 
  (2.78)**  (3.43)** (0.23) (2.65)**  (3.12)** (0.26) 
Importer  Intermediate  0.0070  0.0056 0.0333 0.0068  0.0055 0.0324 
Inputs  (2.06)* (2.21)* (0.72) (1.85)+ (2.02)* (0.70) 
Foreign  Ownership  0.0374  0.0152 0.0115 0.0368  0.0148 0.0186 
  (4.32)**  (3.86)** (0.12) (5.46)**  (4.22)** (0.19) 
Age  0.0009  0.0045 0.0135 0.0019  0.0054 0.0155 
  (0.08)  (0.43) (0.42) (0.17)  (0.54) (0.53) 
Age  Squared  0.0001  -0.0011 -0.0013 -0.0002  -0.0014 -0.0018 
  (0.04)  (0.43) (0.17) (0.05)  (0.54) (0.26) 
Skill  Intensity  0.0262 0.0144  -0.0353  0.0273 0.0148  -0.0422 
  (3.71)**  (2.77)** (0.35) (4.42)**  (3.27)** (0.42) 
Horizontal       -0.0172  -0.0066  -0.0155 
       (3.76)**  (2.28)*  (1.96)+ 
Downstream       0.0220  0.0216  0.0272 
       (4.98)**  (4.77)**  (3.22)**
Observations  28,330  28,330 28,330 28,330  28,330 28,330 
R-squared  0.416     0.416    
AR(2)  p-value     0.732    0.828 
Hansen  Test  p-value     0.530    0.583 
          
Absolute value of robust t statistics in parentheses. **, *, +: statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%. Three 
digit ISIC sector and year dummy variables were included but not reported. Standard errors were clustered at the 
plant level in (1)-(2) and at each sector-year in (4)-(5). For columns (3) and (6) the Windmeijer (2005) correction 
was used. All plants characteristics are lagged one period. TFP, Employment, Age, Horizontal and Downstream 
are in logs. Probit estimates in (2) and (5) are the marginal effects.   6
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